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Loaded Dice and Other Problems:
A Further Reflection on the Statutory Commander in Chief
CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER*
The question of how the Constitution allocates authority over military and foreign
affairs between the President and the Congress has arisen with regularity throughout
the history of the United States. While many of these conflicts quite properly remain
internal to the two political branches, de Toqueville's observation that in America most
important political issues eventually become legal ones is true here as elsewhere.
Inevitably some interbranch conflicts end up in the judicial branch. Professor
Kinkopf s paper focuses on such cases, and in particular on the tendency of the courts
to adopt certain ex ante rules of construction when interpreting any statute that may
bear on presidential actions in foreign or military affairs. Such rules amount to "loaded
dice," skewing in advance what ought to be a situation-specific analysis.'
This brief comment supplements the many excellent points Professor Kinkopf
made, by providing a cautionary note: getting the rules of statutory interpretation
right-while a significant step in the right direction-is likely to have little effect on
overall maintenance of the proper relationship between the President and the Congress.
This requires efforts of the two elected branches of government in ways quite distinct
from the role of the judiciary in correctly deciding the relatively few cases of
interbranch conflict that are submitted to them for review.
In the eyes of many legal theorists and students of the Constitution, this interbranch
conflict pits two opposing conceptions of the Constitution against one another. As
summarized by Professor Kinkopf, the exclusivity understanding of the Constitution
holds that substantial powers have been assigned exclusively to the President, beyond
the reach of any interference by the Congress, so that prohibitory statutes that purport
to impinge on this sphere of exclusivity are unconstitutional. United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.,2 with its encomium to the "plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations" is its urtext.3
The reciprocity approach, on the other hand, understands the Constitution to have
allocated most of the great powers vested in the federal government on a shared basis.
4
Justice Jackson's opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer5 supplies its
scriptural foundation. The reciprocity approach sees a quite different Constitution than
advocated by exclusivity practitioners, one that "enjoins upon its branches separateness
* Charles S. Murphy Professor of Law and Professor of Public Policy Studies, Director of
the Program in Public Law, Duke University.
1. See Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169 (2006).
2. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
3. Id. at 320.
4. Kinkopf, supra note 1, at 1170 (the exclusivity model "divides powers among the
branches and reads those powers as separate and distinct"; the reciprocity model "focuses on the
way the Constitution contemplates that power will be shared among the branches ... .
5. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." 6 In Professor Kinkopf' s words, it
stresses shared powers rather than separated ones.
7
Both of these approaches come in a variety of inflections, and reciprocity theorists
disagree among themselves regarding how much room exists for truly exclusive
presidential action in the foreign and military affairs areas,8 but the degree of
difference among them remains small compared to the distance that separates any of
them from the exclusivity interpretation. A reciprocity theorist is much more prepared
than is an exclusivity theorist to conclude that Congress has the constitutional ability to
override a decision by the President in the foreign affairs or military affairs areas,
provided it enacts a prohibitory statute or restricts the use of appropriated funds. When
faced with a choice between the two approaches, Professor Kinkopf leans toward
reciprocity, and so do I, although we might disagree on matters of inflection. The best
understanding of the constitutional system "should leave room for each branch
meaningfully to play its role in this process," 9 giving effect to what Harold Koh has
termed a "constitutional principle of balanced institutional participation. ' 'I °
The contest between the exclusivists and the reciprocators has been brought into
sharp relief a number of times in our country's history. Prior to the current
controversies that have arisen in prosecuting the war against terror, the most recent
notable historical example arose during the Iran-Contra controversy of the mid-to-late
1980s. The controversy erupted after revelations that a surreptitious program was being
run out of the White House National Security Advisor's office to help the Nicaraguan
Contras by selling arms to the Iranians and then diverting the funds to these Nicaraguan
insurgents. Congress at the time had twice attached annual appropriations riders that
barred any "agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities"
from spending funds "to support military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.""
For reciprocity theorists it seemed obvious that this "off the books" financial support of
the Contras was unlawful because the Boland Amendments prohibited it. For
exclusivity theorists, however, Boland amounted to an unconstitutional attempt to
thwart the President in formulating the foreign policy of the United States as he saw
fit.
12
6. Id. at 635.
7. See Kinkopf, supra note 1, at 1170.
8. Compare HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTON (1990)
(finding very little room for exclusive action) with H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT'S
AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRs (2002) (contemplating a larger sphere of exclusivity for the
President).
9. Kinkopf, supra note 1, at *46.
10. KOH, supra note 8, at 140. This is not to say, of course, that Koh's particular cashing
out of this principle is shared among all adherents to the reciprocity model. I consider H.
Jefferson Powell's understanding of the allocation of interbranch authority to fit under the
reciprocity umbrella, and yet it assigns considerably more foreign affairs power to the President
than does Koh's approach. See POWELL, supra note 8.
11. The riders were named the Boland Amendments, after their House sponsor. Their texts
can be found at 133 Cong. Rec. H7982-87 (daily ed. June 15, 1987).
12. See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, Crime, the Constitution, and the Iran-Contra Affair,
COMMENT., Oct. 1987, at 23, 28.
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What makes the dispute over the Boland Amendment most germane for purposes of
this response to Professor Kinkopf's paper, beyond the clarity with which the
interbranch conflict was posed, is the fact that no resolution came of it in any forum.
The question of Boland's constitutionality never entered the court system in a form that
lent itself to judicial decision, so there was no judicial resolution. 13 No resolution came
from the elites as pundits, current and former government officials, and other opinion
leaders continued to debate and to disagree. The controversy as a whole produced a
weakened presidency in the final years of President Reagan's second term, and in the
mid-term elections the Democrats gained enough seats in the Senate to regain control.
But it is implausible to consider these events as constituting a conclusive referendum
on the allocation of interbranch authority.
Even if Boland had reached the courts, if one looks to the historical behavior of the
courts, it is far from certain that the judges or justices who might have heard the case
would have provided a resolution. Remarkably few of the prior cases in which the
Solicitor General has defended presidential actions in the face of congressional
prohibitions by asserting exclusive or plenary authority in the area of military or
foreign affairs have resulted in clear holdings one way or the other. Notwithstanding its
reciprocity utterances, Youngstown was not such a case because Justice Black's
opinion for the Court concluded that President Truman's actions in seizing domestic
steel mills could not be justified as falling within the scope of the President's foreign
affairs or military affairs powers at all.14 Curtiss-Wright, despite its iconic status among
the exclusivists, was also unable to generate a definitive holding in this regard. The
case involved the President's authority to criminalize the sales of arms to countries
involved in a border dispute in South America. It was not a case, however, that
juxtaposed prohibitory legislation and the President's claim to exclusive powers. In
fact, Congress had passed a resolution authorizing the President to stop the sale of arms
to countries involved in the Chaco border dispute. President Roosevelt immediately
issued an order prohibiting munitions sales to the warring nations in the Chaco border
dispute. 15 Congress, in short, had endorsed President Roosevelt's authority to act.
Therefore, the case hardly presented a circumstance of interbranch conflict.
13. See generally KOH, supra note 8, at 129-39 (discussing the Boland Amendment dispute
between the reciprocaters and the exclusivists, concluding that the legal issue is "unresolved and
the president is free to challenge future appropriations limitations on executive branch actions as
unconstitutional exercises of Congress's power of the purse.").
14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)
("The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military power as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces .... Even though 'theater of war' be an expanding
concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property
in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's
lawmakers, not for its military authorities."). The Solicitor General did not even try to justify the
action as an exercise of the president's foreign policy powers. See also id. at 643-44 (Jackson,
J., concurring) ('There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that the title
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander-in-Chief on
the country, its industries and its inhabitants.... That military powers of the Commander-in-
Chief were not to supersede representative government of internal affairs seems obvious from
the Constitution and from elementary American history.").
15. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1936).
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In fact, throughout much of our modem history, the Court has not confronted the
stark question that the reciprocators and the exclusivists debate so strenuously. This
might seem rather odd given the considerable volume of statutes that purport to
impinge upon powers the exclusivists regard as solely the President' S.16 Much of this
volume was enacted in the post-Vietnam era-the 1960 edition of Legislation on
Foreign Relations comprises 519 pages, while the 1990 edition is 5483 pages.17 Many
of the important foreign affairs or military affairs decisions in the last seventy-five
years-for instance, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.; 8 Dames & Moore
v. Regan;19 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld;20 Rasul v. Bush;2' Rumsfeld v. Padilla22-have
implicated one or more such statutes.
One might well suppose that this volume of legislation would have supplied ample
occasions when presidential initiatives would be confronted by prohibitory enactments,
and that eventually enough of these would find their way into court to have resulted in
a good body of case law concerning interbranch conflict. Upon examination, however,
these statutes, far from hemming in or "fettering" the presidency as some have
23asserted, have been routinely interpreted by the courts to contain implied
authorization of or acquiescence in the President's actions, thus enabling the judiciary
to dodge the interbranch conflict issue entirely. 24 A deferential rule of statutory
construction converts statutes whose origins flowed from a desire to restrict or channel
presidential authority into grants of authority that serve to justify presidential actions.25
When statutes are actually ambiguous, as statutes often are and will continue to be,
16. Kinkopf, supra note 1 at 1175 ("It will be the rare circumstance where Congress has
actually been silent. To be sure, the array of statutes relating to military and foreign affairs is not
so elaborate as that covering domestic affairs. Nevertheless, that array is quite extensive.")
17. JAMES M. LINDSAY, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1 (1994).
18. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
19. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
20. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
21. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
22. 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
23. See, e.g., THE FETrERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE ExECuTrvE BRANCH
(L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989) (collecting essays); Dick Cheney,
Congressional Overreaching in Foreign Policy, in FOREIGN POLICY AND THECONSTrrUTION 101
(Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds., 1990).
24. See, e.g., KOH, supra note 8, at 137-38 ("[Tlhe Burger Court has resurrected Curtiss-
Wright, not so much in constitutional interpretation as in the realm of statutory construction....
[It largely agreed with] executive branch attorneys [who] urged.., a canon of deferential
statutory construction.").
25. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), in which restrictive language in the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) morphed into enabling language,
strengthening the legitimacy claims of the President, is discussed in Kinkopf, supra note 1, at
1176, which provides an excellent illustration. See also, KOH, supra note 8, at 139 ("Justice
Rehnquist['s opinion in Dames & Moore] construed a history of unchecked executive practice,
the fact of IEEPA's existence, and the absence of express congressional disapproval of the
president's action to demonstrate that Congress had impliedly authorized the act, thereby
elevating the president's power .. ") (emphasis omitted).
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such a deferential rule has an even easier time upholding presidential initiatives, all the
while ducking the issue of interbranch conflict entirely.
26
From the viewpoint of the exclusivists, such judicial irresolution helps give them a
good portion of what they seek, namely presidential domination of the foreign policy
and military decisions made by the federal government. One important thesis of
Professor Kinkopf's paper is that this judicial skewing is unjustified and ought to be
avoided. It bears some emphasis, however, that judicial deference does not and could
not produce de facto exclusivity by itself. This judicial approach to interbranch
conflicts works in combination with several other structural and political regularities
that shape the modem policy-making environment in foreign and military affairs. These
include the post-World War II establishment of an elaborate national security
bureaucracy, whose budget is classified and hence never publicly debated and which
gives Presidents an enormous power of operational initiative. The national security
bureaucracy is joined as well by a large standing armed services commitment, essential
in a climate in which displays of military might are regular instruments of foreign
policy. With both the means to initiate action and the intelligence information that may
be supplying the reasons to do so, Presidents who act first and consult Congress later
place that latter institution at a considerable disadvantage in even attempting to
maintain any partnership relations with the executive branch. Senator Vandenberg
noted this phenomenon years ago: 'The trouble is that these 'crises' never reach
Congress until they have developed to a point where Congressional discretion is
pathetically restricted. When things finally reach a point where a President asks us to
'declare war' there usually is nothing left except to 'declare war."'
27
When Congress has the political will to take a more proactive approach to problems
in the areas of foreign and military affairs, it often does not fare much better in
establishing parity in any supposed partnership with the President. As already noted,
legislation is the product of compromises, and Presidents almost always have
supporters within the legislative chambers who will work with the President's forces to
push for such compromises. Occasionally, political stars may align to produce a
genuinely reciprocal arrangement, as they did when the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) was enacted with the full support of President Carter and his
Attorney General, Griffin Bell.28 Such moments, however, are extremely rare. Much
more common are situations like enactment of the War Powers Resolution. 29 Because
26. See GORDON SILVERSTEIN, IMBALANCE OF POWERS: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 13 (1997) (describing post-Vietnam efforts to
constrain presidential authority: "As with any piece of controversial legislation, a compromise
was sought and reached, but in almost every one of these cases, the compromise ended up
adopting broader language, or moving the constraining language from the law itself into a non-
binding preamble or statement of purpose. The legislation left large loopholes, or adopted the
executive's language to secure passage. While Congress as a whole had not endorsed the
executive prerogative interpretation, enough members had, and they forced these legislative
compromises through.").
27. THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF SENATOR VANDENBERG 342 (Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. ed.,
1952).
28. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§
1801-1871 (2004)).
29. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-
20061 1329
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presidential opposition prompted compromises, the Resolution did not accomplish its
objective (whatever one might think of its merits), namely to "put the pressure where it
should be---on the [P]resident to start thinking about removing armed forces sixty days
after he has committed them to a hostile situation;" instead it "puts pressure on
Congress to declare that United States forces are 'in hostilities' in order to trigger the
sixty-day clock for troop removal. 3 °
Equally common may be occasions when members of Congress conclude that their
preferred course of action is to acquiesce in presidential initiatives, choosing either to
criticize or cheer individually while permitting the President to assume full
responsibility for the consequences of the action. Certainly when the initiative involves
the commitment of U.S. armed servicemen and women:
To have supported the [P]resident (and the troops in the field) in a losing cause
is far less damaging to a political reputation than would be the case if one were the
person responsible for deaths or abandonment of allies-both charges being quite
familiar to legislative opponents of every American military action ranging from
the War of 1812 through the world wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and
the Persian Gulf War of 1991.31
These conditions--deferential judicial review, a standing army, bureaucracies with
intelligence gathering capabilities, legislative compromises, and political incentives-
create great difficulties for maintaining effective reciprocal relations and greater ease
in maintaining a regime of de facto exclusivity. In the post-World War II era, the trend
toward de facto exclusivity was halted for a while after Vietnam and Watergate; within
the space for congressional action created in that political climate, both the War
Powers Resolution and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act became law. 32 It was,
however, a temporary cessation, and the trend picked up again with the election of
President Reagan in 1980 and has been largely unabated since. Indeed, by the mid-to-
late 1980s, a considerable stream of scholarly writing was decrying the "fettered
presidency," a lament sensible only to those who conceive of the exclusive or imperial
presidency as the baseline norm and the hiatus of the mid to late 1970s the exception to
that norm.
33
The tragedies of 9/11 only served to increase the weight of these conditions.
Important Congressional actions regarding the war on terror are more accurately
characterized as giving the President nearly everything he has asked for, rather than
evidence of a genuine dialogue. The Authorization for Use of Military Force 34
(AUMF) could have been more broadly written, as the President requested it to be, but
the primary limitation Congress had in mind was to preclude its use as significant new
justification for internal, domestic operations. As a foreign and military affairs
1548 (2000)).
30. KOH, supra note 8, at 127.
31. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 26, at 196 (citations omitted).
32. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 23 (citing works). This is not to say that Congress never interferes in an
unhelpful way with presidential initiative in the foreign and military affairs areas, but only that
the occasions when this occurs pale in comparison to occasions when Presidents are unfettered
in their decision making.
34. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498) (Oct. 16, 2002).
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authorization, the AUMF gives the President nearly everything he needs to prosecute
the war against al Qaeda as he sees fit. Congress also achieved some changes in the
USA PATRIOT Act, but they were marginal tinkerings with an executive branch
design. The ability of committed civil libertarians to stand up to executive branch
pressures for expansive powers was restricted to a few points of successful resistance,
such as imposing a sunset provision on some of the augmented surveillance powers of
Title II, and modulating changes in the jurisdictional scope of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court.
35
In other areas of great public concern, Congress has done nothing legislatively.
Concerns have been raised for four years now about the treatment of detainees at
Guantanamo Naval Base, and yet Congress has taken no legislative action to address
those conditions. The revelations of treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib generated
renewed and heightened concern, as have reports of "black" detention sites run by the
CIA and extraordinary renditions of high-value detainees to countries that practice
torture. Yet Congress had done nothing to address the issue of prisoner treatment until
December 18, 2005, when it enacted a supplemental appropriations bill that contained
the McCain Amendment prohibiting "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment" of any person held in United States custody. 36 Yet even the effectiveness
of this seemingly minor intrusion into presidential initiative has been called into
question by President Bush's signing statement, which warns that the "executive
branch shall construe [this prohibition] in a manner consistent with the constitutional
authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch as Commander in
Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on judicial power ... "37
The halting response of Congress to the events of 9/11 can be traced back to the
institutional and political features mentioned earlier. The apparatus for prosecuting a
global war on terror being already equipped, staffed, and at the ready, the President
had tremendous flexibility in seizing the initiative in the immediate aftermath of those
events. This flexibility was certainly a good thing and a sign that the presidency was
operating with the dispatch and energy that the Framers contemplated would be
characteristic of the office. Once the chain of reactive events was put in motion,
however, Congress's role became and has remained reactive and largely ineffective.
Congress has been controlled by the President's party throughout this period, and often
35. Section 224 of the USA PATRIOT Act originally subjected sixteen provisions of the
Act to a sunset date of December 31, 2005. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 224, 115
Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001). All but two of these provisions have now been made permanent
through the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization Act, Pub. .L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (Mar. 9,
2006). One of the changes made permanent expanded the jurisdiction of the FISA Court to
investigations in which the gathering of foreign intelligence information was "a significant
purpose." This relaxed the former standard in which such information gathering was "the
purpose," but was a more modest change than the Administration's preferred "a purpose"
standard. See Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 218; 50 U.S.C. 1804(a)(7)(B) (Supp. 2004).
36. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2680,
2739-40.
37. President's Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influence Act,




the ties of partisanship have been more powerful determinants in congressional actions
than has institutional jealousy or ambition. Beyond explanations rooted in partisanship,
in the immediate aftermath of U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, members of both
parties became acutely aware of the rapidity with which objections to policy can be
twisted into accusations of disloyalty to our troops on the ground. So, too, the
President's consistent insistence that everything the U.S. does with respect to prisoners
and intelligence gathering is done in the name of making America safer has dampened
the enthusiasm of Congress to assert its supposed partnership status.
A further ingredient that must be added to an explanation of the de facto exclusivity
that has reigned since 9/11 stems from the predispositions of the President himself.
According to all available evidence, this President earnestly subscribes to the
exclusivity understanding of his constitutional role. In that light, it is hardly surprising
that the executive branch has done nothing to promote, and much to suppress, any
genuine partnership or joint participation by Congress in the development of our post
9/11 foreign and military affairs.
Cumulatively, it would appear that these extra-judicial elements go far to explain
the inability of the Congress to implement a reciprocity vision of its institutional role.
The elimination of "loaded dice" would be a salutary development in the role that the
judiciary has been playing in skewing the interbranch conflict toward the presidency,
but the health of the constitutional system depends upon more than a single branch. It
will require reformation of the other two branches as well.
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